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Abstract: Although Rüsen only discusses the crisis of historicism explicitly in his work occa-
sionally, his general perspective on historical knowledge can be interpreted as a response to the 
crisis. Different responses to the crisis of historicism correspond to different interpretations of 
its main problems. In order to specify Rüsen’s response, a number of aspects of his perspective 
are pointed out as solutions to such problems. Indirectly, the analysis discloses problems that 
any plausible attempt to come to terms with the crisis of historicism ought to handle. By iden-
tifying differences to other contemporary responses to the crisis of historicism, the continuing 
relevance of Rüsen’s approach is demonstrated. 
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Introduction 
  
The crisis of historicism has become a topic of interest among contemporary theorists 
like Frank Ankersmit and Herman Paul. As Paul has pointed out, Hayden White’s perspective 
on history writing, which has been an important point of orientation for theoretical debates in 
recent decades, can be understood as a response to the crisis of historicism.1 Ankersmit has 
called for a return to historicism and its idea of the historical individual.2 White and Ankersmit 
theorists represent different responses to the crisis of historicism. Although Jörn Rüsen only 
addresses the crisis of historicism explicitly in a few of his texts, his general perspective on 
historical knowledge can to a large extent – this will be one of my claims – be interpreted as a 
response to the crisis of historicism. One of the central questions guiding this article is, conse-
quently, in what sense can Rüsen’s general theoretical perspective on historical thinking and 
historical research (Geschichtswissenschaft) be seen as a response to the crisis of historicism? A 
second central issue, oriented towards to the contemporary debate within theory of history, 
concerns the relevance of his response in relation to the perspectives mentioned above.  
                                                          
1 Herman Paul, “Hayden White and the Crisis of Historicism”. In Re-figuring Hayden White, eds. Frank Ankersmit, Ewa 
Dománska, Hans Kellner (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2009), 54–73. 
2 Frank Ankersmit, “The Necessity of historicism”, Journal of the Philosophy of History, 4 (2010), 226–240. 
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The argument will be developed in several steps. Before anything else, it is necessary to 
explain why it is not such a crazy idea to discuss theoretical perspectives like Rüsen’s, outlined 
after the 1960s, as responses to the crisis of historicism. Apart from deepening the understand-
ing of important dimensions of Rüsen’s perspective, such an analysis makes it possible to ar-
ticulate problems relevant to take into account in the contemporary debate within theory of 
history. This also concerns the interpretation of the crisis of historicism. Since the concepts of 
historicism and the crisis of historicism are so confused, it is necessary to make some distinc-
tions. I will then articulate a number of problems related to the crisis of historicism that Rüsen 
tried to solve, by analysing his dissertation on Droysen. Indicating his solutions to those prob-
lems makes it possible to indirectly draw some conclusions about the fundamental problems of 
the crisis of historicism. Finally, I return to the point of departure, the contemporary debate on 
the crisis of historicism within theory of history, and point at some significant differences to 
alternative responses to the crisis of historicism and the relevance of Rüsen’s approach.  
 
 
The returning crisis of historicism 
  
If the crisis of historicism took place in the early twentieth century, how could Rüsen’s 
perspective, developed from the 1960s and later, be interpreted as a response to that crisis? 
That is indeed a legitimate question. But, firstly, a certain form of ‘Historismus’ was the main 
current of historical thought during the early post-war era in West Germany. In the 1960s, it 
came under attack from Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics in Wahrheit und Methode (1960), 
from the anti-positivism of the Frankfurt School’s Critical Theory, and from the social sciences 
with its often ahistorical, structural perspectives and strong claims of relevance for the present. 
With such a strong demand for modernization and rejection of tradition, history seemed to 
have lost its relevance, except as a counter-image to the present. In this situation, ‘Historismus’ 
was often pictured as empiricist positivism of facts narrowly academic and focused on the past, 
and under attack for its lack of relevance for the present and for society, for action and orienta-
tion. Moreover, ‘Historismus’ was criticized for being uncritical, as opposed to the critical 
perspectives of Marxism and the Frankfurt School.  
 
Secondly, the 1960s was a time of strong belief in rationality and planning in Germany 
as well as in many other Western countries. From the perspective of the form of rationality of 
the social sciences, history seemed to have little to offer for the rational orientation of action. 
‘Historismus’ could in this context be criticized for the teleological tendencies of its history 
writing, that had accompanied the development of German society towards National Socialism 
and that partly explained the political irrationalism in Germany.3 
  
Thirdly, it is possible to abstract, as Herman Paul does, the general problems related to 
the crisis of historicism, for example the contradiction between absolute moral values and 
historical contextualization of values, and identify similar crises of historicism in other periods 
than 1900–1930. Thus, Paul claims that Hayden White’s Metahistory from 1973 can reasonably 
be interpreted as a response to the crisis of historicism. Actually, the relationship to the crisis 
of historicism of the early 20th century is more intimate than merely a similarity of problems. 
There are also historical links between White’s sources of inspiration, such as Max Weber’s 
philosophy of values and Sartrean existentialism, and the crisis of historicism after 1900: both 
Weber’s and Sartre’s perspectives can be seen as responses to what they perceived as short-
comings of historicism.4 Moreover, Friedrich Nietzsche, whose critique of historicism was of 
fundamental importance for the crisis of historicism, was an important source of inspiration 
for Weber and Sartre, and later also for White. The reappearance of Weberian and Nietzschean 
                                                          
3 Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (Routledge, 1957). 
4 Herman. Paul, “Hayden White and the Crisis of Historicism”, in Re-figuring Hayden White, eds. Frank Ankersmit, Ewa 
Dománska, Hans Kellner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 54–73. 
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perspectives in historiography and theory of history in the decades after 1970 have indirectly 
made the crisis of historicism around 1900 an important point of orientation for contemporary 
theoretical reflection. 
 
For such reasons, it is not just a wild, capricious idea to talk of responses to the crisis of 
historicism formulated in the 1960s. In a text on Meinecke from 1981 Rüsen actually mentions 
the similarities between the debate on historicism in the 1970s and the problems discussed in 
the debate in the 1920s.5  
 
Before we return to Rüsen’s way of coming to terms with the crisis of historicism and 
how the perspective of a historian from the latter half of the 19th century could provide a 
solution in the 1960s to the crisis of historicism of the 1920s, it is necessary to make some 
distinctions between different concepts of historicism and the crisis of historicism. 
 
 
The concept of historicism and the interpretation of its problems 
 
The crisis of historicism has been defined and interpreted in a number of different 
ways. An additional difficulty is that the concept of ’historicism’ or ’Historismus’ is also frus-
tratingly ambiguous. The concept of ’historicism’ or ’Historismus’ has often been used by its 
critics as a kind of ’Other’, defining it in terms of the aspects they were critical of, i.e. historical 
relativism, fact-oriented positivism, narrow political history based on individual agents’ actions 
and intentions, idealist history legitimizing the established regime and the state. Part of the 
reason why the definition of the crisis, of what it was about, is controversial is that it often 
defines the problems involved. Different responses to the crisis of historicism correspond to 
different interpretations of the crisis and its main problems.  
 
Wittkau has argued that the problem of value relativism stood at the centre of the crisis, 
but that the understanding of the problems of the crisis of historicism was blurred by the in-
fluence of Friedrich Meinecke’s interpretation and rehabilitation of early historicism.6 Paul 
argues, against Wittkau but with inspiration from Friedrich Jaeger, that the crisis of historicism 
did not so much concern the validity of values as such, but the ability of historicism to justify 
values, ideas of progress and religious belief. Using the distinction between ’classical histori-
cism’, represented by Ranke, and ’crisis historicism’, referring to the kind of historicism that 
was dominant around 1900, Paul argues, in the footsteps of Friedrich Meinecke, that classical 
historicism had not produced or suffered from the kind of relativism that Wittkau focuses on, 
but had been able to justify values. When the underpinnings of classical historicism had lost its 
reliability, historicism entered a crisis as a form of justification of values and was then replaced 
for example by non-historical forms of justification. Whereas classical historicism had provided 
historical grounds for trust in divine providence and future progress, experiences around 1900, 
especially World War I, caused that trust to implode. Paul also mentions the theoretical diffi-
culty created by the ontological distinction between ’is’ and ’ought’ in ’crisis historicism’.7 
 
There were more problems involved in the German debate around the crisis of histori-
cism in the 1920s, than those that Paul emphasises, but these distinctions will suffice for the 
moment. In this text, the ’crisis of historicism’ usually refers to the critique and debate about 
historicism around the 1920s in Germany, if nothing else is mentioned.  
                                                          
5 Jörn Rüsen, ”Die Krise des Historismus in unzeitgemäßer Erneuerung – Friedrich Meineckes »Entstehung des 
Historismus«”. In J. Rüsen, Konfigurationen des Historismus (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993), 331–356. Cit. fr. 
334. 
6 Annette Wittkau, Historismus. Zur Geschichte des Begriffs und des Problems (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992). 
7 Herman Paul, “A Collapse of Trust: Reconceptualizing the Crisis of Historicism”, Journal of the Philosophy of History, 2 
(2008), 63–82. 
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Understanding more about the problems involved in the crisis of historicism, develops 
our understanding of different responses. Correspondingly, understanding more about differ-
ent responses, deepens our understanding of the problems. Rather than stipulating what the 
problems involved in the crisis of historicism actually were and only then look at Rüsen’s re-
sponse, it is more productive to interpret Rüsen’s response reciprocally in relation to the inter-
pretation of the problems of the crisis of historicism. In that way, understanding Rüsen’s re-
sponse can disclose important problems to handle and deepen our theoretical Problembewußtsein 
of what it means to overcome the crisis of historicism. 
 
 
Recycling Droysen’s historicism through Hegelian dialectics 
 
Rüsen turned to Droysen’s theory of history in order to come to terms with the prob-
lems of historicism, Droysen being the most theoretical of the German historicist historians. 
Rüsen actually refers to several of the central texts of the classical crisis of historicism in the 
introduction to his dissertation on Johann Gustav Droysen from 1966 (published in 1969). 
How come? Rüsen’s study on Droysen starts with an exposition of the general purpose of the 
investigation. The first issue that is mentioned is not, as might be expected, the definition of 
historicism or the need for critical Gesellschaftsgeschichte, but the relationship between philosophy 
and history, between philosophy of history and historical research (Geschichtswissenschaft). How 
come? 
  
Despite the success of ‘Historismus’ in the sense that every possible aspect of the hu-
man world had been described in a historical perspective and made into an object for historical 
research, the self-understanding of the present seemed to have suffered a certain loss of histo-
ry, as if the thoughts and actions of contemporary society were cut off from its historical de-
velopment. In short, history did not seem to have any significance in the mind of contempo-
rary society. 
 
Die historische Methode steckt in dem Dilemma, daß sie um der 
«Objektivität» historischer Erkenntnis willen Geschichte zum Gegen-
stand historischer Forschung verdinglicht und damit die Entaktuali-
sierung der Geschichte innerhalb des Modus ihrer Erforschung be-
stätigt.8 
 
 
If historical knowledge is to have any significance for the self-understanding of people 
in the present, it cannot discard its practical relevance. And then the explanation for the cen-
trality of the issue of philosophy and history appears:  
 
Es [Historisches Denken] muß auf der Vermittlung von methodisch 
vergegenständlichter und aktuell geschehender Geschichte insistieren, 
nur leistet die Methode der Forschung allein diese Vermittlung nicht. 
Um ihretwillen muß Geschichtswissenschaft sich einer geschichtsphi-
losophischen Theorie öffnen. Die vorliegende Arbeit versucht zu einer 
solchen Verbindung von Geschichtswissenschaft und Geschichtsphilo-
sophie durch eine Interpretation Droysens in der Aufhellung der Ge-
nese seiner Geschichtstheorie beizutragen.9 
 
 
                                                          
8 Jörn Rüsen, Begriffene Geschichte. Genesis und Begründung der Geschichtstheorie J. G. Droysens (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schö-
ningh, 1969), 10. 
9 Ibid, 10f. 
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Why turn to Droysen? What was Rüsen expecting to find there? Droysen was the most 
theoretically articulate of the historicist historians of the latter half of the 19th century and a 
methodically conscious historian. At the same time he was critical of, on the one hand, philol-
ogy that idealized antiquity, especially classical Greece, for aesthetic and pedagogical purposes, 
and, on the other, historical scholarship based on critical methods and aiming merely at the 
empirical truth of the past but with no particular significance for the present. Thus, the two 
alternatives ‘historical reality without significance’ and ‘ideal but unreal significance for the 
present’ seemed to negate each other. Droysen greeted historical research and the use of criti-
cal empirical methods, but looked for a dialectical solution to the contradiction mentioned 
(between a meaningful but idealized image of the past and a real but meaningless past) in the 
‘real historical significance of historical phenomena’. To see the real historical significance of 
events and changes it was necessary to put the past, for example classical Athens, into a larger 
coherence of significance.10 In order to expose the meaning of the past in relation to the pre-
sent, the past had to be mediated (vermittelt)11 with the present through this larger coherence. 
 
The significance of the past for the present would become visible if the historian used 
the present as a point of departure and the past could be shown to incarnate the preconditions 
and principles of the present, so that the goal and direction underlying the direction of devel-
opment in the present would become discernable in the past.12 
 
In Droysen’s historical thought, Christian ideas have a significant place. Rüsen analyses 
some of them through Droysen’s history writing on Hellenism. Classical Athens represented 
the break with a mythical and religious world view, creating a straight opposition between 
rationality and tradition. Droysen reinterpreted the Hellenistic period after classical Greece and 
the advent of Christianity as a solution to the alienation and ethical disintegration of the polis 
in that era. Inspired by Hegel, Droysen uses the idea of reconciliation (Versöhnung) in Christian-
ity as a basic principle for the dialectical form of history: life – death – resurrection; tradition – 
negation – reconciliation; myth – abstract rationality – concrete and substantial rationality.13  
 
Man was supposed to be reconciled with historical development by participating in the 
development of the world and making become reality. Instead of religion as subjective mean-
ing and freedom from a meaningless world, or freedom as a negation of religion in favour of 
this world, religion was on the way to become reality in this world in terms of freedom and the 
ideals of practical reason.  
 
Droysen diagnosed his own time as a time of crisis, a time of diremption (Entzweiung) 
and alienation (Entfremdung). This crisis was the result of the attempt to realize the abstract and 
ahistorical ideas of rationality and freedom related to the Enlightenment. It had produced a 
romantic reaction, reaffirming tradition and the past regardless of any demands of rationality. 
In that way, both the ahistorical rationality of the Enlightenment and the non-rational past of 
the romantic reaction confirmed the contradiction between history and reason. The existing 
world appeared as irrational, producing estrangement to society. The attempt to realize the 
ideals of freedom in an ahistorical way had resulted in unfreedom and a perverted form of 
freedom during the phase of the ‘terror regime’ of the French Revolution. The negation of 
religion and tradition had destroyed the existing Sittlichkeit, the living ethical traditions, with the 
result of alienation.  
 
Droysen’s solution to this was to think of rationality and freedom in a historical way, 
making it possible to historically reconcile Sollen and Sein, reason and history. Instead of negating 
                                                          
10 Ibid, 52f. 
11 The word is based on the Hegelian concept of Vermittlung. 
12 J. Rüsen, Begriffene Geschichte, 43–45. 
13 Ibid, 55. 
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reality from the heights of abstract rationality, the historical rationality of the existing society 
ought to be reconstructed, with a vision towards further realization of reason. Tradition and 
history were to be reconciled or mediated by reason. But the content of reason thereby had to 
be thought of in a historical manner, which means it has to transcend the ahistorical under-
standing of rationality of the Enlightenment to historical reason (‘geschichtliche Vernunft’). A 
future dimension was opened in the dialectical history of the realization of reason. The ahistor-
ical understanding of rationality belonging to the Enlightenment was merely a historical phase 
in that history.14 
 
In a similar way, the past and the present was mediated and integrated in a larger histor-
ical coherence of the realization of freedom, so that the present was not merely negated, but 
historicized as a phase in the history of freedom. Instead of abstract and ahistorical freedom, 
freedom was given a concrete historical form, as part of a larger development of freedom. 
Freedom was interpreted as the principle of modernity (’Neuzeit’), with the Reformation and 
the French Revolution as its decisive events. Underlying the development of modern society 
was thus a tendency towards freedom and consciousness of freedom. The state was within this 
paradigm interpreted not as the opposite of freedom that needed to be abolished, but as part 
of the concrete realization of freedom. The content of practical reason ought to become reality 
and the history of the present could be interpreted as characterized by such an underlying 
tendency, although with dialectical moments of negations and severe criticism. In Droysen’s 
own words:  
 
Denn allein eine wahrhaft historische Ansicht der Gegenwart, ihrer 
Aufgabe, ihrer Mittel, ihrer Schranken wird imstande sein, die trauri-
ge Zerrüttung unserer staatlichen und sozialen Verhältnisse auszuhei-
len und die rechten Wege zu einer froheren Zukunft anzubahnen.15 
 
Droysen’s reconstruction of the history of the present had the function of understanding and 
articulating the fundamental tendencies of the present in a historical context, from a point of 
view relevant to the present and its questions and problems. Thus historical knowledge in his 
perspective did not merely have a contemplative character, something that 19th century histor-
icism has often been accused of. In Droysen’s case, the search for historical knowledge was 
consciously inspired by an explicit practical intention on the theoretical level.16 Historical 
knowledge could clarify the present about its historical conditions and orient it with regard to 
the deeper, underlying tendencies towards the concrete realization of the principles of practical 
reason.17 
 
This should not be understood as mere presentism. Droysen’s historicism was based on 
Humboldt’s idea of a transcendental subject of interpretation whose categories of interpreta-
tion correspond to the historical forces that have shaped the present. Subject and object 
should not be understood as isolated, but as mediated. Along the same line, the object of cog-
nition should not be understood merely as a dead thing.  
 
In drastischer Polemik gegen eine Geschichtswissenschaft, die sich 
mit der Erforschung methodisch verdinglichter Vergangenheit be-
scheidet, betont Droysen die Aufgabe der Geschichtswisssenschaft in 
der Bildung des Zeitalters zum geschichtlichen Bewußtsein seiner selbst.18 
                                                          
14 Ibid, 71ff. 
15 Johann Gustav Droysen, Historik. Vorlesungen über Enzyklopädie und Methodologie der Geschichte, ed. R. Hübner, 4th ed. 
(Darmstadt, 1960), 383; here quoted from J. Rüsen, Begriffene Geschichte, 60. 
16 J. Rüsen, Begriffene Geschichte, 120–122, 159. 
17 Ibid, 158. 
18 Ibid, 93. Italics in Rüsen’s original text. The italics should not be interpreted as representing a quotation from Droy-
sen, since quotations in Rüsen’s text are indicated by quotation marks. 
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Droysen überträgt nicht einfach ungeschichtlich politische Denkmodelle aus 
dem Kampf der Gegenwart auf die wehrlose Vergangenheit. Er versucht mit 
diesen Analogien, am geschictlichen Beispiel, Gegenwart jenseits der falschen 
Perspektive ihrer unmittelbaren Gegebenheit selbst zu erhellen. Umgekehrt wird 
erst Vergangenheit in ihrer Bedeutung erkennbar, wenn sie auf die Gegenwart 
als Voraussetzung historischer Hermeneutik bezogen wird. […] erst die mit dem 
Ernst aktueller Geschichtserfahrung gestellte Frage an die Vergangenheit ordnet 
diese in einen Sinnzusammenhang ein, in der Gegenwart und Vergangenheit his-
torisch vermittelt sind.19  
 
 
The experiences and problems of the present made historical questions and categories 
of interpretation relevant, so that historical phenomena would become significant for the pre-
sent. But the present was not understood as a fixed point of departure determining the inter-
pretation of the past, since the understanding of the present was also informed by the interpre-
tation of the history of the present. The mediation (‘Vermittlung’) between past and present 
was part of the groundwork of Droysen’s theory of history and historical reason.  
 
Presentism uses a yardstick independent of the past for interpretation and evaluation. 
Such an approach would correspond to the ahistorical rationalism of the Enlightenment that 
sets ahistorical rationality against the irrational past.20 The idea of Droysen’s historical reason 
was that the form and content of reason must be historically grounded. That presupposes a 
more dialectical relation to the past than presentism or the kind of past-oriented philology that 
focuses on historical facts but cuts off the relation to the present.  
 
According to Droysen’s perspective on historical reason, intellectual principles and di-
rections such as the Enlightenment and Romanticism could be interpreted as relative rational 
moments with their relative historical justification in a larger historical perspective of reason. The 
future direction of development would not be decided by some invented yardstick of reason, 
but developed historically in the present through a dialectical reconciliation of the opposed 
historical moments of reason, which implies a reformulation of the yardstick. The false alterna-
tives of revolutionary and anti-revolutionary realization of freedom ought to be reconciled by 
mediating both alternatives as justified moments of a concept of the whole that represented its 
immanent reason and its historical possibility of success.21  
 
As opposed to both abstract philosophy of history and history writing focused on mere 
facts, Rüsen drew attention to Droysen’s integration of a philosophical dimension into histori-
cal research: ‘er philosophierte sozusagen mit den Tatsachen der Geschichte, um sie bedeut-
sam werden zu lassen.’22 This philosophical dimension should not be understood as merely 
speculative. Its task was rather to perceive and formulate the general principles or tendencies 
of history from the manifold of historical phenomena, as well as to interpret historical events 
and processes in relation to such general ideas.23 
 
Theorie ist dann zur leitenden Sinnbestimmung praktischer Verände-
rung geworden und die Gegenwart aus der Pathologie einander aus-
schließender Prinzipien, aus der «schlechten Dialektik», in der die 
Geschichte der Freiheit zur Geschichte der Unfreiheit pervertiert, 
                                                          
19 Ibid, 45. 
20 Ibid, 70f. 
21 Ibid, 93, 112. 
22 Ibid, 49. 
23 Ibid, 61. See also p. 157f. 
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hinausgeführt zur Verwirklichung der Freiheit als einzig sinnvoller 
Zukunft der Geschichte.24 
 
 
This means that the philosophical dimension of historical knowledge was constituted 
by what Droysen and Rüsen call ‘historical thinking’, rather than by an independent theory or a 
fixed philosophy of history. It concerned both theoretical and practical reason and the realiza-
tion of the freedom and ethical potential of mankind: ‘Erst in der Teilhabe am realen Prozeß 
der sittlichen Mächte erfüllt der historisch verstehenden seine geschichtliche Aufgabe.’25 
 
Consequently, the meaning of historical phenomena did not belong merely to a subjec-
tive dimension and the past as such was not understood as void of meaning, but must be seen 
in relation to the intellectual (geistige) ‘middle’ of history and the ‘sittliche Mächte’ as the centre 
of this process.  
 
Geschichte wäre dann weder zu einem bloßen Dingzusammenhang 
rational vergegenständlicht noch zur reinen Innerlichkeit subjektiver 
Weltanschauung in ästhetischem Sinne verflüchtigt: sie stünde als ak-
tueller Prozeß menschlicher Selbstverwirklichung zur Tradition 
(Übersetzung) nach Maßgabe menschlicher Vernunft an, und histori-
sche Theorie wäre dann ihrer praktischen Dimension versichert.26 
 
 
The substance of history, ‘the History over all histories’, had an immanent teleological 
dimension, related to the ‘sittliche Mächte’.27 The meaning of historical events and turning 
points depended on their relation to these ethical powers and the realization of freedom and 
the ideals of practical reason. The meaning of the present was interpreted correspondingly and 
disclosed with regard to its place in that process. That does not mean, however, that the telos of 
the process was given. As earlier explained, the direction and goal of development was formu-
lated as a result of historical thinking and as a dialectical solution to contemporary contradic-
tions and oppositions between conflicting tendencies. Historical thinking thus did not merely 
receive norms and goals from elsewhere, but formulated goals and directions for the future, 
based on the past and the historically motivated dimension of the present as well as conflicts 
and crises in the present. Practical reason had become historical. In Droysen’s own words that 
Rüsen quotes: ”das, was ist, aus dem, was war, und ward, zu deuten, nachzuweisen, wie unserer 
Gegenwart die lebendige Fortbildung einer an Resultaten reichen Zeit ist, ja wie sie eben dort-
her ihre Rechtfertigung, ihre Richtung, und, wo Gott will, ihre Zukunft hat”.28 
 
Before we go any further, let me briefly summarize the issues mentioned above the 
problems that Rüsen’s re-interpretation of Droysen’s theory of history was supposed to solve. 
First, historical knowledge and historical research was not understood as based on a contem-
plative and aesthetic attitude, or a merely cognitive or theoretical interest, but was basically 
grounded in a practical interest. Second, as opposed to ahistorical rationality and historical 
development without rationality, Droysen formulated a perspective of historical reason. Third, 
as opposed to the past as unrelated and therefore insignificant to the present, the past and the 
present were mediated, so that the past as the history of the present could be shown to be 
significant to the present. Fourth, as opposed to the idea of a fundamental split between the 
interpretative subject and the object, the object of historical understanding was at the same 
                                                          
24 Ibid, 93. 
25 Ibid, 122. 
26 Ibid, 122. See also p. 123. 
27 Ibid, 127. 
28 Johann Gustav Droysen, ”Rede zur tausendjährigen Gedächtnisfeier des Vertrages zu Verdun” (1843), in Deutsche 
Akademiereden, ed. F. Strich (München, 1924), 89–110. Here quoted from J. Rüsen, Begriffene Geschichte, 94. 
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time dependent on the present and the categories of interpretation of the subject and constitu-
tive of that subject. Fifth, the role of normativity and the political dimension in historical 
thinking that had been eclipsed in some other versions of historicism. Sixth, in order for his-
torical studies to be able to accomplish its interpretative tasks, a philosophical dimension must 
be integrated in historical research. Philosophical dimension such as a teleological dimension 
and a larger coherence of significance were merged dialectically with historical scholarship 
based on critical research methods. From such a perspective, it becomes possible to under-
stand the deeper meaning of Droysen’s expression ’forschend zu verstehen’ (understanding 
through research). 
 
 
Addressing the crisis of historicism in the 1960s 
 
How could the perspective of a historian from the latter half of the 19th century pro-
vide a solution in the 1960s to the crisis of historicism of the 1920s? As I have already hinted 
earlier, some clues can be found in the introduction to the study on Droysen. There Rüsen 
writes that since the victory of historicism, all spheres of human life had been made available 
for historical perspectives, but that the self-understanding of the present at the same time was 
threatened by a kind of ‘loss of history’, as if history were of no relevance to the present. His-
tory did not appear any longer as a meaningful dimension of the present, but rather appeared 
as an independent force with no particular meaning or rationality. In this context, Rüsen refers 
to Ernst Troeltsch’s and Karl Heussi’s writings on the crisis of historicism as if they were part 
of the theoretical and historiographical present of the 1960s.29  
 
An important issue was the practical relevance of historical research and knowledge. 
That made it necessary to overcome the limitations of historical methods that objectified the 
past and thereby cut off the meaning of the past from the present. Dimensions of philosophy 
of history needed to be integrated in historical research. These aspects in Droysen’s thought 
made him relevant to the problems in the 1960s, according to Rüsen, but that made it neces-
sary to re-interpret Droysen. 
 
Rüsen’s re-interpretation of Droysen was a way of coming to terms with the crisis of 
historicism. On several occasions in the book, Rüsen defends Droysen and his relevance 
against other interpreters of Droysen and historicism, interpreters that formulated their ap-
proaches in relation to the crisis of historicism. One such important interlocutor is Friedrich 
Meinecke. His interpretation of historicism in Die Entstehung des Historismus (1936) had been 
very influential and represented one response to the crisis of historicism. Meinecke had de-
fended the early form of German historicism, formulated against the universalist rationalism of 
the Enlightenment. It was a form of historicism based on the idea of the development of the 
historical individual and its proper, internal telos and incommensurable yardstick. But, Rüsen 
points out, Meinecke’s interpretation of historicism in general and of Droysen in particular was 
too one-sided. Whereas Meinecke emphasized the irrational character of history as opposed to 
the limitations of rationalist perspectives, Droysen had tried to avoid such conclusions by 
reconciling history and reason dialectically and by mediating the past with the present, as earlier 
explained. Droysen explicitly rejected the alleged opposition between Enlightenment and his-
tory, between historical development and rationality, as part of the crisis that Droysen had 
tried to solve.30 Moreover, if historicism according to Meinecke was based on the incommen-
surability of historical individuals, then Droysen must rather be understood as a critic of histor-
icism.31 It should be observed that the idea of incommensurability is actually only one aspect of 
historicism, in some versions of historicism.  
                                                          
29 J. Rüsen, Begriffene Geschichte, 10, n. 3. 
30 Ibid, 51, 68 n. 91–92. 
31 Ibid, 59f. 
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Another significant interlocutor in this context is Gadamer, who had criticized histori-
cism, including Droysen, in Wahrheit und Methode (1960) for objectifying the past and for having 
a mere aesthetic, contemplative attitude to the objects of historical research. That had, accord-
ing to Gadamer, had the destructive effects of cutting off the relation between historical inter-
pretation and contemporary practice.32 But that is not true in Droysen’s case. The dimension 
of practical reason is integrated in and inspires his theory of history in its foundations.33  
 
Erst in der Vermittlung mit Geschichte als lebendiger Gegenwart vermag die 
Subjektivität ihre hermeneutische Kraft zu entfalten und zu bewähren, die ihr in 
transzendentaler Selbstapperzeption innewohnt, und erst in dieser Vermittlung 
hat historische Hermeneutik ihren zugleich theoretischen und praktischen Sinn, 
hat sie ihre geschichtliche Vernunft. Geschichte wäre dann weder zu einem 
bloßen Dingzusammenhang rational vergegenständlicht noch zur 
reinen Innerlichkeit subjektiver Weltanschauung in ästhetischem Sin-
ne verflüchtigt: sie stünde als aktueller Prozeß menschlicher Selbst-
verwirklichung zur Tradition (Übersetzung) nach Maßgabe menschli-
cher Vernunft an, und historische Theorie wäre dann ihrer prakti-
schen Dimension versichert.34 
  
 
In his book, Rüsen also mentions that the question of the relevance of historical re-
search as well as its role in contemporary historical development, a question that Droysen dealt 
with explicitly, had more or less been absent for a long time, but that it recently had come to 
the fore in contemporary debate – in the 1960s.35  
 
All of these problems – the incommensurability of historical individuals with its impli-
cations of historical relativism as opposed to rationalism, the aesthetic and contemplative or 
purely cognitive attitude of historicism, the objectification of the past and the lack of practical 
relevance of the past for the presence – were problems discussed in the crisis of historicism in 
the first half of the 20th century. Meinecke and Gadamer were important participants in the 
debate around historicism and developed their perspectives on historical studies in relation to 
the problems discussed in the crisis of historicism. Thus, Rüsen’s reinterpretation and defence 
of Droysen’s theory of history against Meinecke’s and Gadamer’s interpretations of historicism 
can be seen as an alternative way out of the crisis of historicism, but directed to the theoretical 
present in the 1960s. Droysen’s critique of historical scholarship and abstract philosophy of 
history in his own time becomes a vehicle for Rüsen’s critique of historical scholarship in post 
war Western Germany. 
 
 
Rüsen’s response  
 
So far, we have concentrated our focus on Rüsen’s book on Droysen. But what about 
Rüsen’s own theory of history that he developed in the decades after his dissertation? To what 
an extent can his general perspective be understood as a response to the crisis of historicism? 
Around 1970 ‘Historismus’ was criticized as the established form of historical scholarship by 
several significant theorists, such as Wolfgang Mommsen (Die Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des 
Historismus, 1971) and Georg Iggers (The German Conception of History. The National Tradition of 
                                                          
32 Gadamer’s model of dialogical interpretation and application and his idea of hermeneutics as practical philosophy 
can be understood as a response to that problem. 
33 J. Rüsen, Begriffene Geschichte, 120–122, 149 n. 139. 
34 Ibid, 122. Italics in orig. 
35 Ibid, 52. 
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Historical Thought from Herder to the Present, 1968).36 These books, as well as Gadamer’s Wahrheit 
und Methode, were discussed critically by Rüsen in a number of tests later published in 1976 as 
Für eine erneuerte Historik. Studien zur Theorie der Geschichtswissenschaft.37  
 
When Rüsen confronts this criticism, he places historicism in a larger historical per-
spective that reveals the historically conditioned character of paradigms of historical research. 
The tradition of historicism itself must be historicised, not in the sense of simply understand-
ing it in its restricted past historical context, but in the sense of thinking about its justification 
and legitimacy in a historical manner. There are structural differences between post war Ger-
many and the 19th century that motivate changes of the established historicist tradition. Also, 
there is criticism that ought to be taken into account, concerning the relationship between 
politics and historical research, the possibility of critique of tradition as ideology, the 
knowledge-constitutive human interest or the practical function of historical research and 
history writing, the historicist idea of the substance of ’history’ as ‘spirit’ (‘Geist’), agents and 
structures as factors of explanation, individualizing vs. general perspectives, and the role of 
theory in relation to empirical historical research. But, as we know, the tradition of historicism 
is not only criticized and negated by Rüsen, certain features are also rehabilitated. The histori-
cal perspective on historicism has the positive function of exposing forgotten problems and 
alternative solutions, and of expanding the resources of argumentation. Just like in Rüsen’s 
study on Droysen, history becomes a way of overcoming the limitations of historicism and of 
confronting the limitations of present theoretical currents. Historicism is historicised as a para-
digm in a larger historical perspective of successive paradigms with their deficiencies and pos-
sibilities. Such deficiencies and possibilities, limitations and alternative solutions produce an 
orienting argumentative force for the future.38 
 
Let us recall that many of the problems discussed around 1970 were also discussed 
around 1920 in relation to that crisis of historicism: the practical function of history, objectivity 
vs. normativity, the need for sociological and structural perspectives, idealism vs. materialism, 
the relevance of critical perspectives as opposed to legitimising perspectives of progress, the 
role of philosophy of history in relation to empirical research, and the limitations of historical 
individualism.39 
 
Since there are a number of problems involved, Rüsen’s response to the crisis of histor-
icism must be differentiated. In the following, I will indicate a number of aspects of Rüsen’s 
perspective of historical knowledge that can be seen as a response to the crisis of historicism. 
Since Rüsen’s general perspective is relatively well known and is explained in other texts, in this 
context I will limit myself to pointing out the relevant aspects, without much further explana-
tion. His general perspective on historical research is, firstly, based on practical functions or 
knowledge-constitutive human interests of history: historical orientation and formation of 
identity. This means that historical knowledge is not understood as based on a contemplative 
and aesthetic attitude, or a merely cognitive interest. The cognitive dimension – ‘theory’ – is 
                                                          
36 Wolfgang Mommsen, Die Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Historismus (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1971); Georg Iggers, The 
German Conception of History. The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present (Wesleyan University 
Press, 1968); German transl.: Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft. Eine Kritik der traditionellen Geschichtsauffassung von Herder bis 
zur Gegenwart (München: dtv, 1971). 
37 Jörn Rüsen, Für eine erneuerte Historik. Studien zur Theorie der Geschichtswissenschaft (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Froomann-
Holzboog, 1976). 
38 Jörn Rüsen, ”Einleitung”, ”Für eine erneuerte Historik – Vorüberlegungen zur Theorie der Geschichtswissen-
schaft”. In J. Rüsen, Für eine erneuerte Historik, 11–16, 17–44. 
39 Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme. Erstes Buch: Das logische Problem der Geschichtsphilosophie. Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 16 (1–2), ed. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter 2008 [orig. 1922]); Mann-
heim, Karl, ”Historismus”, in Wissenssoziologie. Auswahl aus dem Werk (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1970), 246–307. Orig. 
published in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 52 (1924) H.1, 1–60. 
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related to praxis.40 Secondly, the theory of historical consciousness as constitutive of historical 
meaning makes it possible to overcome the idea of a fundamental split between the interpreta-
tive subject and the object.41 This makes it possible, thirdly, to mediate the past with the pre-
sent in such a way as to make the past significant for the present, as opposed to an unrelated 
and therefore insignificant past.42 Fourth, against the kind of historicism that is criticised for 
being focused on objective facts and void of any dimension of ‘meaning’ of the past for the 
present, the category of meaning (‘Sinn’) is put at the centre of Rüsen’s perspective.43 Fifth, the 
category of ‘meaning’ makes it possible to regain dimensions of philosophy of history that 
were often lost in the professionalization of historical scholarship, without returning to any 
dogmatic philosophy of history: a teleological dimension and a larger coherence of significance. 
Just like Droysen and Troeltsch, Rüsen wants to combine such philosophical dimensions with 
historical scholarship based on critical research methods.44 Sixth, the dimension of normativity, 
which is a necessary dimension of history with a practical function, is not separated from 
proper historical research or passively accepted, but integrated into an extended form of scien-
tific rationality, that is supposed to make it possible to reconcile theoretical rationality and 
practical reason, resulting in ethics of historical thinking.45 Seventh, and finally, with inspiration 
from Hegel and Droysen, Rüsen tries to formulate a perspective of historical reason and justi-
fication, as opposed to ahistorical rationality and historical development without rationality.46  
 
I hope that the reader is now able to see why Rüsen’s perspective on historical thinking 
and historical research to a large extent can be seen as a response to the crisis of historicism, to 
the one around 1920 and the one in the 1960s and 1970s. But what is the relevance of that in 
relation to the contemporary debate in theory of history?  
 
 
Rüsen’s response as orientation for the future? 
 
What does it mean to overcome the crisis of historicism? What kind of response to the 
crisis of historicism one finds more convincing, depends on how one understands the crisis 
and the problems involved. Understanding more about the problems involved develops our 
ability to judge the plausibility of different responses.  
 
When Herman Paul explains in what sense Hayden White’s approach to history and 
history writing can be seen as a response to the crisis of historicism, the core of the problem is 
summarized as follows: ‘Why should one want to study the past, if there is no moral education 
to be gained from it?’.47 The problem with historicism and ordinary historical scholarship in 
general is seen by White to be that rational inquiry is separated from the ‘irrational’ dimensions 
of myth, imagination, dream or fiction that could create some moral or political meaning in 
history writing, as opposed to the chaos of meaningless historical facts. The problem of the 
lack of meaning is supposed to be solved by the meaning-creating order and coherence of 
larger narrative patterns. In that way, the problem of the distance between the past and the 
meaning for the present is overcome. The problem of the practical function of history is com-
bined by White with an existentialist understanding of the fundamental freedom of and moral 
                                                          
40 Jörn Rüsen, Historische Vernunft. Grundzüge einer Historik I: Die Grundlagen der Geschichtswissenschaft (Göttingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 1983), 24f, 47–58. 
41 Ibid, 58–64. 
42 Ibid, 53–58. 
43 Jörn Rüsen, ”Geschichte als Sinnproblem”. In Jörn Rüsen, Zerbrechende Zeit. Über den Sinn der Geschichte (Köln: Böhlau, 
2001), 7–42. 
44 J. Rüsen, Historische Vernunft, 51, 55, 111; Jörn Rüsen, Historische Orientierung. Über die Arbeit des Geschichtsbewußtseins, sich 
in der Zeit zurechtzufinden (Köln: Böhlau, 1994), 157; J. Rüsen, ”Geschichte als Sinnproblem”. 
45 J. Rüsen, Historische Vernunft, 98–108, 116–136; Jörn Rüsen, Kultur macht Sinn. Orientierung zwischen Gestern und Morgen 
(Köln: Böhlau, 2006), 59. 
46 J. Rüsen, Historische Vernunft, 8, 16f; J. Rüsen, ”Geschichte als Sinnproblem”; J. Rüsen, Historische Orientierung, 246–
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Martin Wiklund: Rüsen’s response to the crisis of historicism 
 
 
102 
 
responsibility for the meaning constructed and its underlying values. The latter part concerns 
the justification of the historian’s vision of the past, the values this is based on and the mean-
ing implied. The solution to the ironic mode that resulted in the crisis of historicism, is a Nie-
tzschean and existentialist one: to be authentic to one’s moral and aesthetic aspirations, to be a 
courageous moral agent writing monumental histories with the help of one’s imagination and 
creativity.48  
 
Compared to White, Rüsen’s solution does, firstly, not only concern meaning in histo-
riography, but meaning in historical knowledge. White’s solution makes history writing – or 
certain kinds of history writing – worthwhile and meaningful, but the value of historical re-
search and knowledge is difficult to discern. Secondly, the dimension of reason or rationality, 
both in its theoretical and in its practical sense, has little if any relevance in White’s solution. 
White’s form of practical reason does not really have a historical character (even if there is a 
historical dimension to morality in the sense that one is morally responsible for one’s vision of 
the past with its moral and existential implications for one’s attitude to life). In Rüsen’s re-
sponse, the interpretations of the past in relation the present and the future ought to be exam-
ined with regard to the rational justification of its dimensions of experience, significance and 
meaning in order to further practical reason in terms of historical orientation and identity for-
mation. 
 
Frank Ankersmit has pointed to and defended a concept from the tradition of histori-
cism, the concept of a ‘historical individual’. The historical individual as explained by Ranke 
and Humboldt means that ‘each historical thing’ (nation, epoch, civilization etc.) is argued to 
possess a ‘historical idea’, an ‘entelechy’, so to say, wholly specific for itself and for itself 
alone’.49 When Ankersmit comments on the crisis of historicism, he interprets it as a problem 
of historical relativism of values. Dismissing Troeltsch as looking for ‘absolute and time-
transcendent moral and theological truths’ and adding that such an idea is absurd, he claims 
that the crisis of historicism was actually irrelevant. Consequently, a certain interpretation of 
classical historicism seems to become the solution to the evaporated crisis of historicism. An-
kersmit’s solution resembles and seems to be generally inspired by Meinecke’s re-interpretation 
of the classical historicism in Die Entstehung des Historismus, a book which in fact was a response 
to the crisis of historicism. Ankersmit translates the historicist notion of the historical individ-
ual to the condition of the linguistic turn. Thus, the historical ideas must be interpreted not as 
independently existing ideas in the past, but as something existing within narratives, in histori-
ography: ‘we must situate it [the historical idea] in the historian’s language about the past’.50  
 
About Ankersmit’s response to the crisis of historicism there are is much to be said, but 
for the sake of brevity, I will focus on two essential issues here. Firstly, the dismissive interpre-
tation of the crisis of historicism contributes in an unfortunate way to the forgetting of the 
plurality of serious problems involved. It is of course natural that Ankersmit does not formu-
late solutions to those unmentioned problems, but that does not diminish the narrowing of the 
Problembewußtsein. Secondly, it is not clear what problem the solution that Ankersmit presents is 
actually supposed to alleviate. Whether value relativism is a problem or not, or what kind of 
relativism is plausible, can be let aside for the moment. But what the practical functions of 
historical scholarship and historical thinking should be is hardly a question the can be dis-
missed so easily. 
 
Ankersmit’s general argument is oriented to defend the idea that the identity of some-
thing is its history, and that is supposed to make historical knowledge relevant. Does that solve 
the central problem of the practical function of historical interpretations? How does it affect 
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the relevance of the past for the present? The historicist idea of historical individuals tends to 
make the past irrelevant for the present, since every historical individual has its own proper 
and internal yardstick. When the historical individual concerned is the present in a particular 
society and culture, then the genetic history of the present can admittedly deepen the under-
standing of the fundamental ideas and the proper yardstick of this historical individual. 
Meinecke’s book on the emergence of historicism is an example of such a genetic history, 
providing orientation in the present in relation to historical scholarship and the crisis of histor-
icism. Whether that is a recommendable way of giving orientation to the present, is not self-
evident and something I will return to it. There is an obvious risk that this simply reinforces 
the inherited ideas and goals of direction in an uncritical way and that questions about orienta-
tion for the future are simply answered in terms of authenticity: ‘this is who we are’. In any 
case, most aspects of the past and most historical individuals, such as ancient Egypt, the Thirty 
Years’ War or the reign of Louis XIV, hardly belong to the present in the sense described 
(depending on how we conceive of the present, of course). The problem of practical relevance 
thus still needs to be handled.  
 
What is the relation of Rüsen’s response to this? Interestingly enough, he has in fact 
written an article on Meinecke’s response to the crisis of historicism. He points out that 
Meinecke recognized the problem of the practical function of historical knowledge, but he is 
less convinced by Meinecke’s solution. Meinecke opposed the rationalism and the generalizing 
explanations of Enlightenment to the irrationalism of Historismus. Instead he emphasised the 
need to recognise the deep, irrational layers of the human soul and of historical development in 
order to understand historical individual formations. Rüsen agrees with the limitations of ahis-
torical, generalizing rationalism and its inability to understand historical individuals, but points 
out critically that Meinecke’s reactualization of Historismus neglects the claim to scholarship and 
rationality within Historismus and the aspect of methodology. He also neglects the dimension of 
ideas that link the forces of cultural formation in the past with the interests of orientation in 
the present. In that way, Historismus was able to contribute to the consensual formation of the 
collective will power in the present. In Meinecke’s interpretation, a practically efficient relation-
ship of the present to the past is characterised by admiration, awe, and amazement touching 
the whole soul of the interpreter and his or her audience in the present. Such an aesthetic ap-
proach to the past cannot make claims to contributing to the formation of rational, collective 
will in the present.  
 
Seine [Meinecke’s] Ästhetisierung der Geschichte sanktioniert eine 
Ohnmacht des erkennenden Subjekts vor dem Kampf der Interessen 
im gesellschaftlichen Leben der Gegenwart. Der Anspruch des klassi-
schen Historismus auf praktische Vernunft, mit dem seine Ge-
schichtsschribung als Medium der Konsensbildung über gesellschaft-
liche Interessen auftrat, ist preisgegeben.51  
 
 
This points, according to Rüsen, to the need for the use of a) theoretical concepts to in-
terpret and make distinctions not necessarily available in the past as opposed to the irrationality 
of Einfühlung based on awe and amazement, b) perspectives and models from the social scienc-
es that are able to grasp the forces of cultural formation and the relationship between con-
scious intentions and other determining factors in order to overcome the lack of realism in 
Meinecke’s aestheticist historicism, c) a model of practical reason that is able to handle political 
conflicts of interests and criteria of meaning for the interpretation of the past in the present. A 
new, actualized form of Historismus would have to incorporate ‘die unbestreitbare lebensweltli-
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che Erfahrung einer fundamentalen Interessengebundenheit intentionalen Handelns in histori-
sche Erkenntnis über den inneren Zusammenhang von Kultur, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft und 
Politik’.52 At the same time, there is, Rüsen adds, also something to be learnt from Meinecke 
for social sciences and history based on models from the social sciences: the fundamental 
historicization of interpretative perspectives and the individuality of historical phenomena that 
make the specifically historical character of human action accessible.  
 
What about the practical function? ‘Womit kann die Geschichtswissenschaft heute be-
gründen, daß die Erkenntnis der Zeitspezifik vergangenen menschlichen Handelns und Lei-
dens zur Orientierung gegenwärtigen Handelns notwendig ist?’53 Rüsen rejects decisionist 
pluralism and a subjective choice of fundamental norms and criteria of meaning as irrational, 
and instead underlines that in order to overcome such irrationalism, it is necessary to concep-
tualize a perspective of rational reconstruction of the past for the orientation of life and action 
in the present with criteria of validity that at least make it theoretically possible of forming 
consensually plausible perspectives of coherence between the past and the present. Articulate 
use of theories and theoretical presuppositions is necessary, but more important are the general 
norms of rationality: criteria of rational argumentation for reaching a valid consensus.54  
 
Compared to the dissertation on Droysen, such a response to the crisis of tends to di-
minish the dimension of the specifically historical form of reason, the specifically historical 
form of justification. Droysen’s Hegelian concept of historical reason has since around 1980 
been exchanged for Habermas’s model of rational argumentation. The idea of a historically 
based reason does not disappear, seen for example when Rüsen discusses utopia and history, 
but the integration of Habermas’ theory of discourse rationality, the use of models from the 
social sciences, and the treatment of conflicts over the meaning of the past in terms of articu-
late theories and general criteria of meaning and significance, runs the risk of diminishing the 
importance of meaningful historical experience as a base for justification and potential critique 
of criteria, theories and models in the present. In that way, it runs the risk of obscuring the idea 
of a specifically historical practical reason that inspired Rüsen’s dissertation on Droysen.55  
 
The point of exposing differences between Rüsen’s and other contemporary theorists’ 
ways of responding to the crisis of historicism is not only that is makes the relevance of 
Rüsen’s approach more evident, but also that is shows the plurality of problems that contem-
porary theorists need to respond to if they want to come to terms with the crisis of historicism.  
 
 
 
                                                          
52 Ibid, 352. 
53 Ibid, 354. 
54 Ibid, 354–356. 
55 J. Rüsen, Historische Vernunft, 16: ”›Vernünftig‹ ist ein historisches Denken, das in der Form einer Argumentation vor 
sich geht”. However, a richer understanding of the dimension of reason in relation to historical thinking is presented 
in J. Rüsen, “Geschichte als Sinnproblem”. 
